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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, 
Petitioner/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee, 
v. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau 
Chief, Driver License Services, State of 
Utah, 
Respondent/Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Case No. 20010306-CA 
(Lower Docket 000902138) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah code 
Ann. Section 78-2a-3(b)(i), 1953, as amended. In this Appeal the Appellant 
challenges the legality of the district court's ruling finding a violation of his due 
process and statutory rights but fashioning a remedy which only reduced the 
suspension of his driver's license by sixty days. A copy of the order and the 
transcripts of the proceeding are attached hereto as Addendums A and B. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the District Court err in ruling that where there has been notice and a 
hearing, but prior to the hearing there has been an unlawful deprivation of an 
important interest, whether such a violation of due process rights is fatal to the 
revocation. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review is the "correction of error" 
standard. See Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Ut. App. 1990). 
In addition, the issue concerns statutory interpretation, requiring application of the 
correctness standard. State v. Arviso. 993 P.2d 894 (Ut. App. 1999). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Appellant was represented by counsel at the trial de novo hearing held 
on December 21, 2000. During the hearing the argument was centered around the 
issue in this case. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge entered an order 
ruling in the defendant's favor, finding that the defendant's due process and 
statutory rights had been violated, and fashioning his own remedy of a sixty day 
reduction in the suspension period. See Addendum A at 5. After orally ruling 
from the bench, counsel for the Appellant specifically preserved his argument by 
objection to the Court's ruling. See Addendum B at 29-30. 
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RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute and constitutional provision will be determinative of 
the issue on appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2) 
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested by 
a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection 
(1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the person shall be 
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to 
the test or tests can result in revocation of the person's license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does not 
immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver 
License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License Division's intention to 
revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the 
officer served the immediate notice on behalf of the Driver License Division, he 
shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(hi) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License 
Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before 
the Driver License Division. . . 
United States Constitution Amendment 14 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 21, 2000, the Appellant was arrested for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol. At the time of his arrest, the police officer took the 
appellant's driver's license for refusing to submit to a breath test. Instead of 
issuing the appellant a temporary driver's license, the officer deprived the appellant 
of this important right without a hearing in violation of his Due Process and 
statutory rights. On December 21, 2000, after a hearing in the Driver's License 
Division, the Appellant had a trial de novo before the District Court. See 
Addendum B, Transcripts of Hearing. At that hearing argument was heard and the 
judge determined that the defendant's rights had been violated by the officer's 
actions. Addendum A at 5. The Court fashioned its own remedy and reduced the 
appellant's suspension period by only sixty days. Addendum A at 5. 
A final written order was entered and signed by the Court on February 22, 
2001. Addendum A. A notice of Appeal was filed on March 9, 2001. The 
Respondent filed a notice of cross-appeal on March 26, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol on 
January 21, 2000, by Officer K. Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department. 
The officer, acting in behalf of the Respondent, seized the Appellant's driver's 
license and served the Appellant with a form approved by the Respondent, that 
notified the Appellant of his right to request a hearing for his driving privilege 
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within ten (10) days. Addendum A at 2. The form has boxes at the bottom where 
the officer, acting as an agent of the Respondent, can indicate with a mark that the 
form is either "VALID" or "NOT VALID" as a driver's license for up to thirty 
days. Addendum A at 2-3. The officer marked that the form was "NOT VALID" 
as a temporary license for the reason that the Appellant refused to take a breath test 
requested by the officer. Addendum A at 3. The trial court concluded that the 
action by the officer violated Section 41-6-44.10(2)(b)(ii) 1953 as amended and 
also violated the Appellant's due process rights and fashioned a remedy reducing 
the suspension period by sixty days. Addendum A at 5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court correctly ruled that the officer's actions violated the statute 
and the defendant's due process rights when the officer deprived the appellant of 
his driver license privilege without a hearing. The lower court incorrectly ruled 
that the violation was not fatal to the revocation process and instead fashioned a 
remedy reducing the suspension period by sixty days. 
The ruling of the District Court that the violation of the Appellant's rights 
was not fatal to the revocation process has at least two ramifications. First, there 
would be little deterrent effect to the officers if the driver's license could be 
suspended even after their improper conduct. Second, the remedy would be 
limited to only those who could afford an attorney in the civil matter and who 
could afford to pursue a trial de novo in the District Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO FIND 
THAT THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION BY THE POLICE 
OFFICER WAS FATAL TO THE DRIVER'S LICENSE 
REVOCATION PROCESS. 
Discussion 
The United States Supreme court and the Utah appellate courts have 
recognized that a defendant has certain due process rights in connection with the 
right to possess a driver's license. In Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535 (1971), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that "[o]nce licenses are issued, as in 
petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of 
a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that 
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not 
to be taken away without that procedural Due Process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id- at 539; see also Amendment 14 United States Constitution. The 
Court went on to state that "[t]his is but an application of the general proposition 
that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement 
whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege.'" Id- (citing 
Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
In Ballard v. State. Motor Vehicle Div.. Licensing Dep't.. 595 P.2d 1302, 
1304 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court held that "the right to drive is a 
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valuable right or privilege and it cannot be taken away without procedural due 
process." More recently, the Utah Supreme Court also stated that "[a]t a minimum, 
timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are 
at the very heart of procedural fairness." In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 
1996). 
The driver's license statute at issue in this case recognizes these safeguards 
and provides for notice in the statute. See Utah code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(2). The 
statute itself does not explicitly state a remedy for a violation of the due process 
rights it protects. The Appellant believes that instead of the sixty day reduction in 
the suspension period ordered by the District Court, the remedy should have been a 
finding that the violation of the statute was fatal to the revocation process. 
The facts of this case are that the officer did not issue the Appellant a 
temporary license and instead revoked the Appellant's license without any due 
process at all. In this case the language of the statute is mandatory using the word 
"shall" when it comes to issuing a temporary license. Utah Code Ann. 41-6-
44.10(2)(b)(ii). In interpreting the very same statute this Court has stated that the 
term "'shall' is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such in 
this and other jurisdictions." Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204, 207 (Ut. App. 
1988). The mandatory language makes a violation of the "shall" requirement a 
violation of the statute. 
The violation of the statute is fatal to the revocation process. In a recent case 
this Court affirmed a lower court holding finding a violation of this very same 
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statute to be fatal to the revocation process. In Mabus v. Blackstock, 994 P.2d 
1272 (Ut. App. 1999), the issue was the failure of the police officer to inform the 
petitioner of the officer's intent to revoke the petitioner's driver's license and the 
manner in which the petitioner could obtain a hearing as required in the same 
statute at issue here only instead of subsection 2(b)(ii) being at issue it was 
subsection 2(b)(iii). Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44.10(2)(b). 
In Mabus, the Court held that the "failure rendered the administrative 
revocation of appellant's license and the derivative district court review void and 
the revocation a legal nullity." 994 P.2d at 1275. In comparing the holding in 
Mabus, to this case the remedy should be the same. The deprivation of the 
petitioner's right and privilege to drive without first providing the right to have a 
hearing violates the statute and any subsequent revocation is a legal nullity. In 
Moore v. Schwendiman, the Court held that a violation of this same statute at issue 
in this case, by failing to file a police report within five days of arrest, resulted in a 
finding that the revocation of the driver's license that followed was a legal nullity 
and the district court review of the revocation was void. 750 P.2d at 207. 
The officer in this case, acting as an agent of the Driver's License Division, 
violated the appellant's statutory rights. Although the statute does not expressly 
state a remedy, this Court's prior cases support a finding that the subsequent 
revocation was a legal nullity as the appropriate remedy. See Mabus v. 
Blackstock, 994 P.2d 1272; Moore v. Schwendiman; 750 P.2d 204. 
There are many reasons for finding that the violation of the statutory 
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reqi lirements by the officer should result in a fin<!,n.<j 1hat an\ Mihseonent 
revocation is a legal nullity. If there is no remedy iui a \ lolaiiun v\ uu>> type, or if 
then the Driver 's I icense Di\ ision does not have any impetus to properly tram its 
agents (the police ofticers) ; here would be little to keep off icers fi om ecu i in iittii ig 
this same violation < :)ii other drivers, knowing that there is no repercussion to the 
violation so long as a hearing is made available after the fact. Also, and perhaps 
afford To challenge their illegal revocation, with both a hearing and a costK trial de 
n O V O .'-I LnC D l S l i ' t ^ i v O u i ' i u ' u s u %>i>tuill a T C t H C d } .•->;
 lw M u i i i i i u - . . ;, 
fit i : -• " rh>sc that , •:•••* * *f*. •-.;* ,;ch -en ice^ as the\ wouid never 
be able to receive a remedy for the officers improper actions, I he officer's 
Division and at" aon^n thai ioi '«^ ^o mo improper conduct should be held to be a 
legal nul iv MIL ui^uict court M U H H : iMKiiiiL. - violation ma vunpiv eCduvinu'u^e 
d that the 
violation was tatal to the re\ ueation process. 
Five cost includes the hiring of an attorney to go to the revocatioi 
filing fee in the District Court for the trial de novo and die costs of ai 
the District Court. There would also be additional costs in fmw> <m -u 
and possible child care or many other related expenses. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the luicgoing reason-. i,.^ ..ppciium ro.pc^-full^ i equests tl: la t tl: lis Cot n t 
•---.-•:* = •• ..:•; as tu the remedy it fashioned after correctly finding a Due 
Process \ loiatiun. 1 ne Appellant asks this Court, to rule that the proper remedy is a 
Inulii./ that I he MLIIIHI. r1 iUr '.tntiih' L "I. • | v ! " « r - • rr»* IM ll I'H.il I" l'ie 
revocation process and any suspension of the Appellant* > driver's license was 
improper. 
R ESPEC I F ( II I Y S ( ] ilK II I FED this ^ ^ ^ d a y of June, 2001. 
. ^ ^ - ^ ^ -
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
Attorney for Appellant 
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RTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I Benjamin A. FLiiii;,*,.., hereby certify that I have caused to be hand 
• :. i copies of the foregoing to me Utah Court of 
\ppe.iK ^ " scuim Male. Fifth Floor. .40230, Salt Lake Citv. Utah 841 U • ; • 
A;, v, oils Building. 160 East 300 South, o ' Floui, P.U. Bo\ i4'jN54, this 
day of June _0; 
< ; ^ * ^ ^ ^ 
Benjamin A. Hamilton 
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ADDENDUM A 
IHSIK^TPOTRTOKhl U 
Benjamin A. Hamilton (#6238) 
Attorney for Defendant 
356 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-3622 
' I I ! '1 ", i ' j i M 1 • :)!(' i * . i v i . > i - " T ( ' / \ i * o i e v ' I X V { tyru X R ' - \ 1 [ - \ 7 
| \ A \ 1 ) H J R S A ! I ! A k l - t O F N ' h M A I F O F I T A H 
PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, 
vs. 
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, 
Director, Utah State IVKer 
License Division, 
FINDINGS UF FAG I1, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Respondent. 
Case No. 000902138 
Judge RONALD E. NEHRING 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for a • :ai ov //MW< on Decembc; 2", 
• i mi. • ] appeared and the Respondent appealed thiwugh counsel Reoeeca I) Waidiosi, ASMstant 
Attcrnev General Prior to the Man v! tru 'hearing, the Prt!tu<rei agreed and stipulator that the 
• :\\ - lie Ann ^ 4 ;-o-4-F anci the reading o: the chemical test admomoons to the Pemionei anc 
the establishing of the knowing refusal were and are met. Fhe 'Petitioner only challenges the 
confiscatioi \ of his di ivei ":'s license and pi ivilege by the Respondei it, through the arresting officer 
pi ior to affording the Petitioner with a, hearing. 
presented a: me hearing, being fully advised in the premises, makes the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDING OF FACTS 
1. On January 21, 2000, the Petitioner, PHILLIP EDWARD MILLER, (hereinafter the 
"Petitioner") was arrested for Driving Under the Influence in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44, by Officer K. Olsen of the West Valley City Police Department.. 
2. After the arrest, the Petitioner was transported to the West Valley City Police Department 
and was read the chemical test admonitions verbatim from the DUI Report Form. The 
Petitioner was requested to submit to a chemical test to measure the alcohol content of his 
breath. Officer Olsen, acting in behalf of the Respondent, read The Petitioner the refusal 
admonition and the Petitioner refused to submit to the chemical test. 
3. The arresting officer seized the Petitioner's driver's license and, acting as an agent of the 
Respondent, personally served the Petitioner a form,1 approved by the Respondent, that 
notified the Petitioner of his right to a hearing for his driving privileges if requested within 
ten (10) days of his arrest. 
4. Pursuant to the notice, the Petitioner requested a hearing with the Driver License Division 
and the hearing was held on February 15, 2000. As a result of the hearing, the Petitioner's 
driving privileges were revoked for one (1) year for his refusal to submit to a chemical test 
after an arrest for Driving Under the Influence. 
5. The above mentioned form (Exhibit 1) has boxes at the bottom where the officer, acting 
as an agent of the respondent can mark a box indicating that the form is either "VALID" 
or "NOT VALID" as a driver's license for up to thirty (30) days. 
1
 Petitioner's Exhibit 1. 
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6. A f t e r c o n f i > j a i i i i u ,.,.
 f ^'..w. IIL, - v l ; i v c ; .-, i k c i b ; : . M : . . , , \ -].>,:;« v : . ec i \ cu m e b o x on t h e 
f o r m i n d i c a t i n g m a t m e f o r m w a s ' " N ( ) i V A i d ! ) ' .:s a t e m p o r a r y l i c e n s e 1 he r e a s o n 
s t a t e d b y i 1 i ~ o 1:1:1. c e i :fo i i I o t i s s I i i n i i a t e i i i p :»i a i y 1 i c e i i s e v a s t h e I } e t i 11 o r i e i ' s i e f i i s a I t c t a I : e 
t h e r e q u e s t e d b r e a t h tes t . 
Section 41-6-44,, 10 Utah Code Annotated (19,53 as amended) requires that when a person 
refuses to si ibi nit to a, cl lei t iical test aftei ai i ai i est foi Di i ;BI n :»; 1 l"i icl.ei !:,! r e l i ifli i e i \o ::::', the ai restii tg 
officer 
. . . shall sei ve on the person, on behalf of the Driver I icense Division, immediate notice 
of the Driver License Divisions intention to revoke the pe rson ' s privilege or license to 
opera te a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the 
Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or pen nit, if any, of the opera tor ; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days\ and 
I in) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Drivei Licc:;:^ J I M ; . ^ , , . ,;sic 
information reuardinu how to obtain a hearinu before the Dr i \ e r 1 icense Division. 
i r e oificei. a^iing ou benali ;>: the Resa-ndent \w .his ^asc, seized the Petit ionee's license 
and failed to i w i e a ^^n^poian license to *• »" -"n^ne r 1 ne d e p p \ a n o n *••:" m-- P^ -n ^ ;\s 
license ., :.; i ^ - *
 r . . . . . 4 it t o a 
h e a r i n g t o c h a l l e n g e t h e p r o p r i e u >d t he d c p i i\ .in- n «il h ^ u n \ :;g p n \ i l e u e I he P e t i t i o n e r 
e x e r c i s e d t: I i a, t i i g t 11:, 1 1 i e h e a, i 11 i s > v ' a, s h e I, d a, i i cl 11 i e R, e s p o n cl e 111: i e v o k: e cl l: 1 i e P e t: i t: i o 11 e r' s cl i i v i i i, g 
pr ivilege for one year,, 1 1 ic ir itegi ity of the lieai mg was not: compromised by the unlawfi ,il, 
suspension of the Peti t ioner 's driving privilege between the arrest of the Petitioner and the 
1 i c a i ii ii »;, 
I his court concludes that the i lature of the problem presented here is not, a, systemic 
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problem in law enforcement but is rather a problem of an isolated nature and one occurring only 
from time to time infrequently Therefore, it is this court's responsibility to fashion an 
appropriate remedy for the violations to the Petitioner's statutory and due process rigths The 
court has considerable discretion in fashioning a remedy to this type of due process violation The 
Petitioner argues that the United States Supreme Court, in Bell v Burson, 402 U S 535, 91 S Ct 
1586 (1971), held that due process requires notice and a hearing before there can be a deprivation 
of the interest here involved 
The precise question presented in this case is - where there has been notice and a hearing, 
but prior to the hearing there has been an unlawful deprivation of an important interest - does the 
unlawful deprivation of one's driving interest restrict the Driver License Division from taking any 
further authority to effect a deprivation9 Or rather, is the Respondent in this case precluded from 
revoking the Petitioner's license based on the previous violation of the Petitioner's statutory and 
due process rights9 The answer is no. The Respondent may properly proceed with the process 
which might result in the further deprivation of the Petitioner's rights The Respondent's actions, 
however, are subject to the fashioning of a remedy by the District Court 
The court hereby concludes that the revocation of the Petitioner's driving privilege was 
appropriate The court also finds that, given the facts and circumstances of this case, the 
Petitioner's driving privilege should be reinstated by the Respondent Sixty (60) days prior to the 
One (1) year revocation previously ordered by the Respondent 
4 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the revocation of the Petitioner's driving privilege be 
upheld with the modification that the revocation be for a period of One (1) year, less Sixty (60) 
days to remedy the Petitioner for the violation which occurred to his statutory and due process 
rights 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revocation be stayed pending an appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals of this Order 
Dated this Z£* , day of February, 2001 
Approvers to form 
REBECCA D WALDRON 
Attorney for Respondent 
5 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
^ I hereby certify that on the Wv day of February, 2000, a true and correct cops of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was mailed to the following 
Rebecca VValdron 
Assistant Attorney General 
PO Box 140857 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84114-1857 
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DUI 
SUMMONS AND CITATION 
STATE OF UTAH 
JNTY OF >-• 
VOF 
-IE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
/EN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
)F. 
) AT. 
"7^^ 
lan (5) nor more than (14) da/si f ter , issuance^ 
tion. 
JSUING 
ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCY 
CASE 
NO. CITATION NO. D318373 
NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) 
ADDRESS 
J 
(City) (State) 
Driver License No. 
7 '7 
Height 
Vehicle Make -
; 
Class 
Weight 
Expires 
Eyes 
Vehicle Type Year 
State Restriction 
Sex 
Color 
DOB 
Zip 
Social Security No. 
Vehicle License No :  is 
Accident 
C Yes 3 No 
C o m m . Vehicle 
G Yes D No 
Motorcycle 
D Yet Cf No 
State 
Haz. Material 
D Yes D No 
Expires 
Direction of Travel 
N S E W 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
• UTAH CODE D COUNTY CODE • CITY CODE NO.: -
ON THE . DAY OF . 1 9 . MILITARY TIME . 
LOCATIQN ' : . MILE POST NO. 
VIOLATION(S): 
A<m C. ^v** 'V' '**» *+•* U-*m *- ..V** V 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN 
SIGNATURE 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
_1 
C ^ U T ^ I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS SUMMONS AND CITATION WAS DULY SERV U uru i^J I n r u r r c i \ U A l \ i I 
ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: L e t ' s s e e , d id I t a k e t h a t f i l e or d id 
you? 
( I n a u d i b l e ) 
THE COURT: Let's turn to Miller versus Blackstock, 
000902138. 
Counsel, would you please state your appearances? 
MS. WALDRON: Rebecca Waldron for the respondent. 
MR. HAMILTON: Ben Hamilton for the petitioner, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: It looks like Mr. Hamilton just handed 
Ms. Waldron the same case that Mr. Hamilton just gave to me 
and I — 
MR. HAMILTON: What I just handed her was, she 
asked to see a copy of the code. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. I haven't read— 
MS. WALDRON: But he previously just handed me a 
copy of the same case he just handed you. 
THE COURT: That I haven't read. 
MR. HAMILTON: Would you like to take a recess 
before we begin this? We've narrowed the issues 
significantly and instead of looking at probable cause and 
having to put on the witness to establish that the officer 
had sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and perform 
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the field sobriety tests, we're foregoing that and focusing 
instead on just the one issue. 
And if the Court would like to hear the issue and 
then take a recess to read that case, (inaudible) 
THE COURT: I'm going to accept that invitation. 
Yeah, I'd like to have you kinda give me some context of the 
case, then I'll read it and then I may come back and pick it 
up again. 
MR. HAMILTON: Sure. 
THE COURT: Are you comfortable with this, Ms. 
Waldron? 
MS. WALDRON: Yeah, I am. My—I'm fine. We had 
talked—okay. We had talked about it and this is continuing, 
we had talked about it, you know, about three months ago 
(inaudible) but the issue is, is usually on these notices, 
the officer will check the license—that piece of paper is 
valid for a period of 30 days until the hearing. It didn't 
happen in this case and the issue is, is that (inaudible) the 
Driver's License ability to suspend or revoke the license. 
And I'm right now looking at 41-4-6-44.10. I 
wonder—you wouldn't happen to have the 53-3 Section, would 
you? 
THE COURT: What section should I be looking at? 
MR. HAMILTON: The relevant section here, your 
Honor, is—Mr. Miller's driver's license was suspended under 
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41-6-44.10. And— 
MS. WALDRON: There's two—there's two code 
sections. That one, and then the 53-3-223. 
MR. HAMILTON: And the Title 53 section deals with 
suspension of driver's licenses on what's called per se 
suspension, based on the probable cause to have arrested the 
individual in the first place for DUI. And— 
MS. WALDRON: There should be a similar one under 
the refusal. 
MR. HAMILTON: And Title 41, the section under 
Title 41 deals with whether the individual refused to blow in 
the machine and the suspension based on that and that's the 
issue before the Court today because that's what Mr. Miller's 
license was suspended on. 
If you'll notice, in the citation— 
THE COURT: Well, let me make sure I understand. 
So, your contention is that Title 53 isn't relevant 'cause 
we're not fighting the battle over probable cause? 
MR. HAMILTON: Right. But it's virtually identical 
in terms of what the officer's duties are. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HAMILTON: So, it really doesn't matter which 
one we go off because the language is identical, but I think 
we should be focusing on the proper section— 
THE COURT: Which is the 41-6-44. 
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1 MR. HAMILTON: 44.10, that's right. 
2 THE COURT: 44.10. 
3 MR. HAMILTON: And—and last—and we—and the 
4 petitioner would move at this point to have admitted as 
5 evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which is a copy of the 
6 citation and form published by the Driver's License Division 
7 that is required to be handed to my client and served before 
8 any suspension can be done. 
9 And you'll notice that the— 
10 THE COURT: Well, just a second. 
11 Ms. Waldron— 
12 MS. WALDRON: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: —any objection to Exhibit 1? 
14 MS. WALDRON: No objection, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Exhibit l's received. 
16 MR. HAMILTON: You'll notice at the bottom of that 
17 form, it gives the officer the opportunity to check one of 
18 two boxes, one box saying, this is valid and the other 
19 saying, not valid; has a temporary license for up to 30 days 
20 from the date of this notice. 
21 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
22 MR. HAMILTON: The officer checked that this is not 
23 a valid license and I think we can stipulate that the officer 
24 confiscated the Utah license from Mr. Miller; is that fair to 
25 say? 
MR. MILLER: Yes. 
MR. HAMILTON: So, I believe we have a stipulation 
from the Driver's License Division at this point, that Mr. 
Miller's license was taken, his physical license, the 
certificate. He was issued instead this driver—this 
citation, which is also—should be a permit, assuming he had 
a valid driver's license and that, we would also ask for a 
stipulation. 
THE COURT: All right. So, let me make sure I 
understand, Mr. Hamilton. 
The valid/not valid option is present to cover 
those circumstances in which the person cited does not have a 
valid operator's license at the time of the arrest? 
MR. HAMILTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: So that there isn't a de facto grant of 
a—of a temporary license to someone who didn't have one in 
the first place; is that— 
MR. HAMILTON: Yes. So, the officer, on—acting— 
acting on behalf of the Driver's License Division isn't 
taking authority that he doesn't have— 
THE COURT: That he doesn't have. 
MR. HAMILTON: — t o give somebody a license when 
they don't have one in the first place. 
THE COURT: So, the arresting officer makes an 
initial determination as to the validity of the driver's 
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license status and based on that determination, checks one 
box or the other; is that correct? 
MR. HAMILTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HAMILTON: And that was in fact done here, but 
instead of checking that this is a valid license, temporary 
license, the officer checked that this is not a valid 
temporary license for up to 30 days. 
The statute—the reason for the 30-day limitation 
is because the statute, in meeting due process grounds, has 
set forth that the hearing must occur on whether they're 
going to revoke or suspend this individual's license within 
the 30-day period. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: And so—so we're not taking away the 
individual's driving privileges without affording him the due 
process of having notice and right to a hearing— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: —it's required that the person be 
granted this temporary driving privilege. 
THE COURT: Got it. 
MR. HAMILTON: The—the officer checked for his 
reason for not issuing a temporary license, at the bottom of 
the citation, was the refusal of the test. 
In the refusal statute, which is the 41-6-44.10 
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statute, under Subsection (2)(b)—these are the requirements 
that the officer is supposed to meet. Following one, under 
Subsection (a), if the person does not immediately request 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer 
be administered, a peace officer shall serve on the person on 
behalf of the Driver's License Division immediate notice of 
the Driver's License Division's intention to revoke the 
person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. 
Now, that was done. On behalf of the Driver's 
License Division, the officer submitted to Mr. Miller this 
citation, which is the notice approved of by the Driver's 
License Division and at the bottom, where it—in bold type, 
in small type but in bold type, it affords Mr. Miller the 
notice of his right to a hearing. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: So that was complied with. 
When the officer serves the immediate notice on 
behalf of the Driver's License Division, he shall do the 
following: 
(1) Take the Utah license, certificate or permit, 
if any, of the operator—which was done; 
(2) Issue a temporary license effective for only 
29 days, which was not done and that's our contention; and 
(3) Supply the operator on a form approved by the 
Driver's License Division basic information regarding how to 
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request a hearing, which was done; and a citation issued by 
peace officer may, if approved as to form by the Driver's 
License Division, serve as a temporary license and that is 
what was provided. This form, which the Court has before it 
as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, is the form approved and the 
officer violated 41-6-41.10, Subsection (2)(b)(ii). 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, I'm going to ask you what 
you are going to anticipate from me as the obvious question. 
I assume that I entered a stay here? 
MR. HAMILTON: You did. 
THE COURT: Okay. And so Mr. Miller's driving 
privileges have been intact to today? 
MR. HAMILTON: That's not correct. 
THE COURT: That's not correct? 
MR. HAMILTON: No. 
MS. WALDRON: I think he has— 
MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) is— 
MS. WALDRON: I—I—I was counting it up. He was 
arrested on January 22nd, something like that, and the stay 
was granted on March something; so if it was suspended, it— 
if you count the— 
MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) arrest until we got it 
through the Driver's License hearing which was—ruled against 
him— 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
9 
MR. HAMILTON: So, he didn't have a license from 
the time he got arrested through the hearing at the Driver's 
License Division, which he was supposed to have through that 
time period and then when they took action to take away his 
license and revoked his driving privileges for a year, we 
appealed it. It continued to be lost until the State, or the 
Driver's License Division requested a continuance— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WALDRON: Well, actually, I think— 
MR. HAMILTON: —at that time— 
MS. WALDRON: I'm looking at the file. 
THE COURT: Well, but the— 
MS. WALDRON: The stay was signed on March 2 2nd. 
THE COURT: Why don't we—why isn't all this moot 
except for whatever deprivation of Mr. Miller's rights might 
be proven occurred during that interval of time between the 
arrest and the administrative hearing? 
MS. WALDRON: See, that's our argument is that 
whatever, you know, they had the—the hearing was basically a 
post-deprivation hearing and it was determined at that point 
that there was enough—that it made—met the requirements to 
suspend or revoke his license for a year— 
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Waldron, what I want to hear 
from is—actually, that question was directed to Mr. Hamilton 
since I kind of anticipated that you'd be— 
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1 MS. WALDRON: Yes, (inaudible) your Honor— 
2 THE COURT: —(inaudible) this one— 
3 MR. HAMILTON: And that's—that's why I want the 
4 Court to read the United States Supreme Court case dealing 
5 with a similar issue, dealing with driver's licenses but a 
6 different type of issue. 
7 The issue in the case that's been presented which 
8 is Bell vs. Berson. is whether an individual who was in an 
9 accident that was uninsured is entitled to have a hearing 
10 before his license is suspended. In Georgia, they didn't 
11 have the opportunity to even have a hearing. 
12 It's not right on point, but it is persuasive in 
13 that the court held that where there is a due process 
14 violation such as this, when you take somebody's privilege or 
15 right that they have, they've got an interest in this 
16 driving, this driving privilege and when you take that away 
17 from the driving—by the Driver's License taking it away by 
18 having their agent, the officer, issue a form and violate my 
19 client's, not only the statute indicating what the officer 
20 must do on behalf of the Driver's License Division, but as a 
21 result of that, also violating his due process rights to not 
22 have these privileges taken away unilaterally without first 
2 3 having a hearing on that. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. But here's—here's the—the 
25 central question, as near as I can tell: Did the deprivation 
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of his—of his due process rights, in other words, the sus— 
unilateral suspension in violation of the statute, compromise 
the integrity of the ultimate hearing? 
MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, we feel that—that that 
is moot, that doesn't matter because it was taken away 
without him ever having had the chance for the hearing. 
THE COURT: But just a second. 
MR. HAMILTON: I understand your question. I 
understand your question and I think at that point, what you 
and I think— 
THE COURT: We're (inaudible) past one another, 
though. 
MR. HAMILTON: No. But I—I agree that the Court 
is—what the Court sees as the issue is: No harm, no foul 
because he had the hearing and the Driver's License Division 
took it away based on the hearing. But the Driver's License 
Division, through this officer, in fact, took it away before 
the hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, we're going to—we're going 
to come to that piece of the puzzle, but first, it would seem 
to me that you would have a stronger due process claim if 
there was a connection between the absence of driving 
privilege and what happened at the hearing itself. For 
example, inability to retain counsel or act—or this caused 
kind of undue influence, inability to gather evidence, 
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something that—that undercuts the legitimacy, the integrity 
of the hearing itself. 
MR. HAMILTON: I think what the Court is saying is 
if there had been some further prejudice against Mr. Miller, 
that the petitioner's argument would then be strengthened. 
THE COURT: If it would have affected the—the 
hearing. 
Now, let me see if I can—if I can probe a little 
bit what your point is. And let—first, let me see if I— 
make sure I understand it, and that is, for the purposes of 
argument, we'll spot you, Judge, the conclusion that the 
hearing, one, occurred and was—and two, was an appropriately 
conducted hearing. But that doesn't matter because there is 
an independent issue concerning the deprivation of his 
driving privileges in violation of, one, the statute; two, 
the Constitution. 
MR. HAMILTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, then that contention raises, 
among others, the following issue: And that is, first, what 
remedy do you seek? 
MR. HAMILTON: The remedy we seek is an order 
depriving the Driver's License Division the opportunity of 
taking away his license based on this answer. 
THE COURT: Because? 
MR. HAMILTON: Because his due process rights were 
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violated at the get-go. Just as in a criminal case, when 
your due process rights are violated, the evidence can't come 
in. And what we're asking for is, this due process right was 
violated because he was never afforded notice in a hearing 
before— 
THE COURT: Uh huh. All right. Mr. Ham— 
MR. HAMILTON: —driver's license revocation. 
THE COURT: What's the—what—what would be the 
result under the following facts? The officer gives Mr. 
Miller Exhibit 1, gets back to the station, looks it over, 
light goes on, Oh, my God, I've given him the wrong form, 
I've checked the wrong box. He then causes a corrected 
report to go to Mr. Miller. And for my hypothetical, let's 
say that that occurs three days later. 
Do you still win? He's been deprived of his right 
for three days, does that deprive the—the Driver's License 
Division of proceeding with the hearing? 
MR. HAMILTON: I think it should but that's not the 
facts before us and we're only here to decide what facts are 
before us. 
THE COURT: I understand, but the principle is to 
what degree must an individual's driving privileges be 
unlawfully deprived before that deprivation eliminates the 
opportunity of the Driver's License Division to revoke the 
license pursuant to the statute? 
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MR. HAMILTON: Well, I--I would put to the Court 
that as soon as this individual leaves the custody of the 
officer and he leaves the custody of that officer who's 
acting on behalf of the Driver's License Division without a 
valid driving privilege, which he entered into the custody of 
that actor, that state actor with, then there's been a 
violation of the statute and the statute is written to 
comport with due process, Constitutional due process 
requirements that if a state actor is going to take away the 
right or privilege of an individual citizen, they have to do 
it according to due process requirements; that is, they have 
to give notice and the right to a hearing previous to the 
driver's license suspension or revocation. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Uh huh. Why can't I fashion 
an equitable remedy which penalizes the Driver's License 
Division for the, what turns out to be as a practical matter, 
a premature deprivation of Mr. Miller's driving privileges by 
ordering reinstatement of his driver—driving privileges 30 
days in advance of when it would otherwise be available? 
MR. HAMILTON: Well, your Honor, if he was without 
his driving privileges during which—during the time when he 
should not have been without them, he went all the way 
through, without having his driving privileges and the issue 
is not trying to fashion some kind of equitable remedy that 
penalizes the Driver's License Division, that's not what 
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we're interested in. What we're interested in is a remedy 
that puts Mr. Miller back in the position that he would have 
been, not just had the officer complied, but to show the 
Driver's License Division: You violate somebody's 
Constitutional due process rights and there will be no 
authority for you to take action against that person's 
privilege. 
And here's why, because if—and this is what the 
Driver's License Division is currently doing—if this 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 had never been served upon Mr. Miller, 
that would have been a violation of the same due process 
rights because he would never have had the notice of a 
hearing or right to a hearing under his due process 
Constitutional rights. 
When that happens, the Driver's License Division 
says, Well, okay, we are then precluded from taking action. 
And rightfully so. And here, we have the same type of due 
process violation, taking away the privilege before hearing. 
THE COURT: Well, but in the first instance, there 
is a complete deprivation of the right to notice and hearing. 
The arrestee has no knowledge that the arrestee has any 
opportunity to challenge the loss of license. 
In—in this case, at least there is a communication 
to the arrestee that the arrestee has a right to challenge 
the—the suspension of the license. 
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MR. HAMILTON: Then I'd like to change my 
hypothetical. Let's assume, because the statute requires 
that the individual submit the request for a hearing within 
ten days of getting the ticket or the notice provided by the 
Driver's License Division. If the officer retained that 
citation and notice from the Driver's License Division, 
forgetting to serve it upon the individual and served him 
five days later, still providing ample time for Mr. Miller to 
then make his request within the ten-day period, there's 
still such a violation that the Driver's License Division 
would not take the driving privilege. 
THE COURT: But that goes to the point that I 
raised first and that is, are we talking about a violation 
that compromises the integrity of the hearing? And I agree 
with you that—that shortening the statutory notice period is 
a—a substantial violation because it does precisely that. 
It makes less likely the arrestee's opportunity or that he'll 
exercise the opportunity to request a hearing. Ten days is 
ten days. Ten days has been determined to be the reasonable 
time to request a hearing. 
And if there's a shortening of that period due to a 
lapse in the—in the—in law enforcement's procedure, in my 
opinion, that's something that compromises the right to a 
hearing, the integrity of the hearing. This— 
MR. HAMILTON: I feel that the Court is saying—I'm 
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sorry. 
THE COURT: Oh. Go ahead. I'm done. 
MR. HAMILTON: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: You said you understood it. That's 
good enough for me so I'm going to— 
MR. HAMILTON: Okay. I understand what the Court 
is saying; however, the real issue is whether or not due 
process rights of the individual have been violated. That's 
all we need to look at. If there's been a due process 
violation, then the actor, the State, or a subsidiary 
thereof, is precluded from taking action. 
THE COURT: But we have examples, you know what 
really comes to mind is probably the biggest example I can 
think of, is Miranda, where the United States Supreme Court, 
when confronted with a, what it determined to be a huge 
pandemic problem involving due process, fashioned a remedy 
that really wasn't—well, that included possibilities of the 
death penalty in the sense of the exclusionary rule; but was 
clearly attempting, in my view, to kind of fashion a remedy 
consistent with the level of egregiousness of the violation 
of the Constitution. 
Why shouldn't I do that here? 
MR. HAMILTON: Because the United States Supreme 
Court in this case, even though the facts are different and 
if the Court will turn with me maybe— 
18 
THE COURT: Did I bring that case in with me or did 
I decide I was going to take a recess and read it out there? 
THE CLERK: It should be in the file. 
THE COURT: It is. Okay. 
Mr. Hamilton, where do you want me to turn? 
MR. HAMILTON: Okay. My computer printed this up 
as Page 5. It's actually Page 539 of the opinion. 
THE COURT: Got it. 
MR. HAMILTON: At the very bottom, the last two 
sentences, it says: Suspension of issued licenses does 
involve state action that adjudicates important interests of 
the licensees. And that's what we're dealing with here. In 
such cases, the licenses are not to be taken away without 
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
And then in turning a couple more pages to my Page 
7, Page 542 under the U.S. Reporter. Towards the bottom of 
that paragraph that indi—that starts with Key Note 7 or Head 
Note 7. 
THE COURT: Got it. 
MR. HAMILTON: Right where Foot Note 5 begins, in 
the—in the—in the paragraph. Due process requires that 
when a state seeks to terminate an interest such as that 
herein involved, and that was the driving privilege, it must 
afford notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the 
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nature of the case before the termination becomes effective. 
Here, he was given notice and right to a hearing, 
but that suspension or revocation became effective before he 
was provided the opportunity for the hearing. They got it 
backwards. And that's what happened here, they got it 
backwards, they took away the privilege, then gave the 
hearing. 
And the U.S. Supreme Court says no, such a 
privilege as this, someone's driving privilege, if you're 
going to take that away, State, first give them the hearing, 
then you can take it away. Not the other way around. 
And so we're saying that based on this case and Mr. 
Miller's due process rights that were here violated and I 
think that's pretty apparent, and there was a violation of 
the statute as well and the statute was drafted to afford due 
process rights under the Constitution. That's the reason it 
was drafted the way it was so that there would not be a 
suspension prior to the hearing. 
And in fact, Driver's License Division, if you want 
an extension of time for the hearing, if you want to continue 
it because your attorney or yourself is—has a conflict with 
that day, in order for you to get that extension, you have to 
waive your right in writing to have the hearing after they 
suspend. So, they'll take your license at the end of the 30 
days, if the hearing has been scheduled after the 30 days and 
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in order for them to even consider continuing it after that 
30-day period, when this Exhibit 1 is valid as a driver's 
license, you've got to waive that privilege in writing. 
And so even though the Driver's License Division in 
other instances is trying to comport with the statute and the 
requirements of due process, in this case, they didn't try to 
do that. Thereafter, the officer took away my client's due 
process rights by suspending or revoking his privileges 
before the hearing. And that's all it comes down to. 
Was there a violation of due process right? If 
there was, then there can be no action by the Driver's 
License Division. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. Well, Ms. Waldron, first, do 
you concede that—that there was an erroneous failure to 
provide Mr. Miller with a temporary license? 
MS. WALDRON: I do concede that. He should have 
been granted the—the temporary license (inaudible) yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, what to do? 
MS. WALDRON: Well, you know, in—in cases where 
the issue of civil rights is addressed or deprivation of 
property rights, whether it's—and I don't have any cases to 
cite, but when there's a post-deprivation hearing, when a 
person is granted a hearing after the right has been—an 
individual has been deprived of that right, there has been 
case law which has said that that is sufficient. 
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And whether—I know there's some with regard to 
inmates, when they've been deprived of property or whatever, 
and then after the fact, they've been given a post-
deprivation hearing. I believe that the courts have said 
that that's sufficient to cure the lack of a hearing prior to 
the deprivation. 
And as our argument here is because there was a 
hearing after the fact, there was technically a post-
deprivation hearing, even though that hearing dealt with— 
with respect to the Driver's License Division, the initial 
revocation, there was evidence presented, the hearing officer 
heard everything and at that time, determined that his 
license should be revoked. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm spotting you the—that there 
was an appropriately conducted hearing; but we've still got 
an individual who was deprived of a privilege, a state-
granted privilege of considerable importance and 
significance. No one—no one is going to seriously debate 
the importance of driving privileges; after all, that's why 
the deprivation of that for driving while intoxicated is a 
serious piece of business. Not only does it protect the 
citizens from impaired drivers on the road but the driving 
privilege is something of considerable value to all of us. 
And so what we've got is Mr. Miller, who has been 
wrongfully deprived of something that is important for 30 
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days. 
And so, really, what we're talking about here is,— 
is one, does it matter? And I—I hear you telling me, well, 
Judge, it doesn't matter, which isn't—that's a loser. I 
mean, I— 
MS. WALDRON: Well, no, it's not that it doesn't 
matter. It's just that if there was no hearing at all, I 
think we'd be in real trouble; but the fact that there was a 
post-deprivation hearing, so there was a hearing, and—at 
which time his license was revoked, I think we're looking at 
the remedy. I mean, there was that 30 days— 
THE COURT: We are—exactly— 
MS. WALDRON: —we're looking at the remedy here. 
THE COURT: And so I'm—I'm inviting— 
MS. WALDRON: And— 
THE COURT: —you to suggest a remedy for— 
MS. WALDRON: Well— 
THE COURT: —me. 
MS. WALDRON: — I think the most logical remedy 
from the respondent's point of view is, to whatever days his 
license was suspended prior to the initial hearing be 
deducted from the year. So, it would be a total of a year 
from the ini—would be from the date of arrest. 
THE COURT: From the date of arrest rather than— 
MS. WALDRON: From the date of the arrest for a 
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year. And that would be the—the respondent's feeling of 
appropriate remedy, whereas, because it was—if you look at 
the case law and I think the post-deprivation hearing cures 
any due process violation, but you have the—you have to look 
at that 30 days and factor that in to whatever the revocation 
is. 
MR. HAMILTON: May I respond, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Please do. 
MR. HAMILTON: On—on the bottom of that Page 5 
that I referred to, referred you to earlier, just as this 
Court has indicated, it's an important interest, this driving 
privilege. And as it says, suspension of issued licenses 
thus involves state action and adjudicates important 
interests of the licensees. 
And it goes on to say, In such cases—and that is 
the suspension of an individual's license—the licensee's 
are—the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Here, there was a violation of the procedural due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it was violated and 
therefore, this individual's license is not to be taken away. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. HAMILTON: His privilege is not to be taken 
away. I don't know what cases Counsel's talking about of 
post-deprivation, a post-deprivation hearing. Clearly, 
24 
they're not dealing with driver's license which the U.S. 
Supreme Court has already said, hey, this is an important 
interest, this driving privilege. If you're going to take 
that away, you can't take it away unless you comply with the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. 
And here, the State has already admitted that they 
did not comply with that; therefore, they are precluded or— 
or this Court is precluded to—from fashioning some other 
remedy, other than outright granting of the petitioner's 
petition. 
THE COURT: Is there any indication that—that this 
event was anything other than a (sic) isolated oversight on 
the part of one officer? 
MR. HAMILTON: I have seen it happen on one other 
occasion and my client on that occasion did not wish to 
appeal; but I think the Driver's License Division needs to be 
aware that this is the same type of due process violation as 
is service of process. It's the same type, so that they're 
not—so that when these isolated instances, when officers are 
less than adequately trained, when they do this, the Driver's 
License Division should be notified to that. This one person 
doesn't get his license taken away. If you comply with the 
procedural due process requirements, yeah, then yeah, at a 
hearing, you can take it away; but if you don't, you don't 
get to. 
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It's not happening very often. I do a lot of DUIs 
as this Court's probably already aware and I see one every 
two years, maybe. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. WALDRON: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Ms. Waldron? 
MS. WALDRON: Just one brief thing. With respect 
to this case, Bell vs. Berson. it's my understanding—and I 
haven't read the whole thing, that no hearing was afforded at 
all in this case. 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MS. WALDRON: Is that correct? 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. HAMILTON: That is right. 
MS. WALDRON: And I think that is a really big 
distinguishing factor. You know, if no hearing was afforded, 
yeah, I think it would be a due process problem; but we did 
afford a hearing, and so that would distinguish our case 
extremely from Bell vs. Berson. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HAMILTON: Except that referring to the latter 
part that I cited to earlier, Notice and opportunity for 
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case before the 
termination becomes effective. This termination of driving 
privileges became effective before the hearing. And so the 
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language in the case is sufficient to say, this is an 
important enough privilege or right that we're not going to 
let you take away their license if you try to take it away 
before the hearing. 
THE COURT: It's an interesting problem and one 
which, in my view, merits the following result: 
First of all, I find that there has been a—a 
deprivation of Mr. Miller's statutory right and his right to 
due process by reason of the failure to provide Mr. Miller 
with a temporary license, as mandated under the statute. 
I next find that Mr. Miller was advised of his 
right to a hearing to challenge the propriety of the 
deprivation of his driving privileges, that he exercised that 
right, that his driving privileges were in fact revoked for a 
period of one year pursuant to a hearing, and that the 
integrity of the hearing wasn't compromised by reason of the 
unlawful suspension of his driving privileges for the period 
of time between arrest and the hearing. 
Next, it's rele—it's relevant, in my view, that 
the nature of the deprivation here is not a systemic problem 
in law enforcement or within the Driver's License Division 
but is one which occurs from time to time. As law 
enforcement officers share with judges the—the flaw of being 
fallible from time to time, probably law enforcement less 
than judges. 
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My task is to fashion an appropriate remedy and I— 
in my view, I have considerable discretion in fashioning a 
remedy to a due process violation. 
Mr. Hamilton has drawn my attention to the case of 
Bell vs. Berson and I commend Mr. Hamilton for his typically 
thorough research into these—into these matters. The Bell 
vs. Berson case has been argued for two principles. Mr. 
Hamilton argues the language in the lead opinion, might even 
be the unanimous opinion, for the proposition that there must 
be notice and hearing before there can be a deprivation of a 
property interest or any other Constitutionally protected 
interest. 
Ms. Waldron urges that I bear in mind that there 
are important distinguishing characteristics between Bell vs. 
Berson, to-wit that the driving force in Bell vs. Berson was 
that there was no provision for any notice of hearing in 
Georgia prior to the deprivation of driving privileges for 
failure to provide evidence of insurance. 
I think the—that Ms. Waldron's analysis of—of 
what's going on in Bell vs. Berson is more relevant to—to 
this setting and that the precise question presented in this 
case, and that is, in a case where there is—there has been 
notice and hearing but there has also been a pre-notice and 
hearing deprivation or pre-hearing deprivation of rights, 
does that deprive the governmental entity of any further 
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authority—authority to effect a deprivation? 
The answer to that, without the presence of a 
systemic problem, is no. The State may properly proceed with 
the process which might result in further deprivation of—of-
-of rights or interests subject to the fashioning of a 
remedy, which I'm about to fashion. 
I conclude that, one, the administrative revocation 
was appropriate. 
Two, that it is appropriate, given the facts and 
circumstances in this case, to reinstate Mr. Miller's license 
60 days earlier than it otherwise would have been reinstated. 
That conclusion is based on my evaluation, based on 
a totality of the circumstances of the egregiousness of the 
deprivation. 
MR. HAMILTON: May I just make a record briefly, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Please do. 
MR. HAMILTON: Due process rights inherently 
individual as opposed to the community and it's our position 
that the Court holding that it is not a systemic problem is 
irrelevant to the determination as to whether this 
individual's due process rights have been violated, because 
they're individual rights. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I understand. 
MR. HAMILTON: And so we would ask the Court at 
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this point to modify its holding and make it appropriate for 
trie individual as opposed to the community, because that's 
not why we're here. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Although not articulated, I—I 
had taken actually what you said into account and I'm going 
to stand by what I did. 
MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And thank you, folks. It's always a 
pleasure to see you. 
MS. WALDRON: Your Honor, would you like me to 
prepare the appropriate order and—and— 
THE COURT: That—that would be great. 
MS. WALDRON: —show it to counsel? 
THE COURT: Since, for the most part, you've been 
able to just kind of sit here and observe this morning. 
We'll give you something substantive to do. 
MR. HAMILTON: Your Honor, could we ask for a—an 
order staying— 
THE COURT: So you can appeal? 
MR. HAMILTON: —so we can appeal? 
THE COURT: Have you got a problem with that? 
MR. HAMILTON: I think it's an interesting enough 
issue that— 
THE COURT: Yeah, I think it's a fascinating issue, 
MS. WALDRON: I think it's a fascinating issue. 
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I'll agree. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And I'll grant it. 
MR. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: So, when— 
MR. HAMILTON: If there is an order in place right 
now— 
THE COURT: Let me just tell you what that's done. 
That's shifted to you and away from Ms. Waldron the 
responsibility for drawing the papers. 
MR. HAMILTON: I'll draw them up and have them 
approved as to form by Ms. Waldron and submit them to the 
Court for signature. 
THE COURT: And I look forward to the result. And 
you know, because it's going to be appealed, spend some time, 
you may want to get the videotape, writing down in, I don't 
know, as comprehensive a form as you think is appropriate, 
the rationale for what I did. I appreciate that, in fact, 
can we give Mr. Hamilton a tape? We're going to give you the 
tape. 
MR. HAMILTON: On behalf of Mr. Miller, thank you. 
THE COURT: No problem. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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